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THE ROLE OF MARITIME POWER IN THE WAKE OF 
THE GULF WAR 1990-1991 
"If anyone wishes to know the history of this war I will tell them it is our 
maritime superiority which gives me the power of maintaining my army, while 
the enemy are unable to do so." 
- Wellington describing the Peninsula Campaign, 1813. 
Iii 
I1I1 
If 
~ll 
'i 
2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 4 
SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY 6 
Classical Theories 6 
Maritime Strategy 8 
Recent Conceptions 8 
US Maritime Strategy 9 
THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER AND CRITICISMS OF SEA POWER 10 
End of the Cold War 11 
Local Conflicts Rather Than Global 12 
Collective Security 12 
Level and Type of Threat 13 
Reduction in Available Resources 14 
Spread of Arms to the Third-World 15 
Utility of Military Power 16 
Crisis Control 17 
Social Concerns 18 
MARITIME ASPECTS OF THE GULF WAR 18 
Iraqi Maritime Strategy 19 
Iraqi Objectives 19 
Iraqi Navy 20 
Sea Denial 21 
Coalition Maritime Strategy 23 
Coalition Objectives 24 
Initial Maritime Reactions 24 
Maritime Interdiction 26 
Military Sealift and Sea Lines of Communication 28 
Power Projection and Conflict Operations 30 
Command Control and Communications 32 
MARITIME LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR 
Utility of Maritime Power 
Sea Denial 
Sea Control 
Maritime Interdiction 
Power Projection 
Sea Lift 
Technology 
Naval Presence 
J oint and Combined Military Operations 
The Gulf War In Perspective 
33 
34 
34 
35 
35 
36 
38 
39 
40 
40 
41 
I I 
I ill 
II' 
I :l 
I' 
I,' 
III 
I'~ 
I 
IiI 
1,111 
3 
THE FUTURE FACE OF MARITIME POWER 
Naval Vessels 
Sea Denial 
Sea Control and Power Projection 
Naval Diplomacy 
Naval Cooperation 
Other Peacetime Tasks 
CONCLUSIONS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX 
Chronological Sequence of Key Maritime Events of The Gulf War 
FIGURE 
The Middle East 
43 
43 
45 
45 
46 
48 
48 
49 
52 
III 
1'1 
III 
I ~ 
1,1 
II 
II 
I, 
III 
1'1 
~ i' 
I til' 
I' 
Il 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Second World War the primary focus for strategic 
analysis has been on a bi-polar world, consisting of the USA and USSR and their 
respective allies at the opposing ends of the world stage. With the rapid pace of 
world events that was seen in 1990-91 such analysis has become increasingly 
irrelevant. 
The last few years have seen some remarkable changes in what was 
previously considered to be the established world order. The end of the Cold War 
and the dawn of what US President George Bush once termed the 'New World 
Order' have been heralded as bringing in a new era in international relations. As 
well as political transformation though, there have also been major economic, 
technological and social upheavals in the modern world. Change is being 
experienced at an unprecedented rate and is becoming ever more difficult to predict. 
This combination of developments in all major spheres of national 
interest will increasingly present new circumstances and risks and will in turn demand 
reassessment of traditional attitudes and policies for security. It already seems 
certain that these changes will have important implications for the future role and 
development of military power. 
The continuing role and relevance of navies in a changing world have 
so far received little detailed attention. What discussions there have been, have 
tended to be coloured by topical issues, such as the need for individual ships, rather 
than rational consideration of the whole field of maritime power. The recent Gulf 
War l however, has provided a unique opportunity to examine the practical 
application of maritime force in an international crisis and conflict. 
The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 initiated a 
train of events that was to lead to the largest combined military operation of the 
1 
The term 'Gulf War' in this paper is used to define the period 
from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 Aug 1990 to the end of the 100 hr 
land offensive on 28 February 1991. 
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post-World War Two period. Thirty-nine independent nations were eventually to 
contribute elements of their armed forces or provide financial support to the 
Coalition cause. 
The war was significant, not only for its magnitude, but also because it 
was not in any way a policing action fought to preserve the existing balance between 
the two great power blocs. It was thus a very different conflict to the earlier wars of 
the nuclear era such as Korea and Vietnam. As a major milestone in the use of 
military force it is very important that the war be properly analysed in the current 
context of worldwide change, so that relevant lessons, if any, may be gleaned and 
applied to future operations. 
In the USA particularly, inter-service rivalries have already led to 
claims and counterclaims regarding relative performance and effectiveness. For most 
analysts, the Gulf War seems to have been primarily examined as an example of the 
efficacy of air power, finally proving the Douhet-Mitchell doctrine of strategic air 
warfare.2 The United States Air Force has even gone so far as to claim that air 
power singlehandedly defeated the Iraqi Army. 3 
Conversely, the view of the proponents of land operations stresses that 
despite the air offensive it was the final Coalition ground offensive that actually 
became the catalyst for the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.4 Then again, 
the view of the maritime persuasion is that the air campaign was a rather crude 
bludgeon and that without the support of Coalition sea power and its unchallenged 
control of the sea, the land operation could not have taken place at all. Thus, 
maritime forces are meant to have provided what the editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, 
2 See for example Kopp C, 'Desert Storm' in Australian Aviation, 
April 1991. Giulio Douhet in Italy and General Mitchell in the USA were 
among the strongest advocates of the primacy of air power. Air power to 
them meant a completely new type of war and in their view the 
concentration of effort on obtaining command of the air would provide 
rapid and overwhelming victory. 
3 
"This is the first time in history that a field army has been 
defeated by air power." Statement by General McPeak Chief of Staff USAF, 
quoted in 'The Most Successful Air Campaign Ever?' in Military Technology, 
4/91, p. 36. 
4 
See for example Flanagan E, 'The 100-Hour War' in ARMY, April 
1991, p. 18. 
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has termed 'the enabling factor' for the whole operation.5 
A fourth and final school of thought, with a more wide-ranging view, 
but no less parochial, has also made itself felt. In this view all three environments of 
air, land and sea were successful, largely because of the superior military technology 
available to the Coalition.6 Thus, it is argued that honours for the liberation of 
Kuwait should more rightfully be bestowed upon Western high technology rather 
than any of the individual branches of the armed forces. 
There are of course elements of truth in all of the positions taken and 
a combination of these and many other factors would probably provide a more 
correct assessment. The primary aim of this paper will be to examine the role of 
maritime power both during and after the Gulf War. The events of 1990-91 will be 
used as a case study to assist in an analysis of the ways that maritime forces may 
have to evolve to remain useful in the new strategic environment. The paper will 
also argue that despite the new environment, the traditional benefits of maritime 
power still remain largely unchanged. 
SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY 
Oassical Theories 
The study of classical strategy continues to serve a useful purpose. By 
analysing historical examples, certain maritime themes can be seen to have had 
continuing validity. This is not to say that traditional thinking will always remain 
relevant and correct. Modifications have been made in the past and will continue to 
be made, to allow for scientific development and technological innovation. Thus the 
advent of steam, armour, submarines, nuclear and guided weapons have each in their 
5 
See editorial comment by Captain J Sharpe in Jane's Fighting 
Ships 1991-92, Jane's Publishing, London 1991, p. 43. 
War' , 
6 
Capps A, 'The High-Tech War' and 'Smart Weapons for a Desert 
in Defense & Diplomacy, May 1991, p. 7. 
II 
1'1 
I' 
I: 
lilll 
7 
turn been regarded as revolutionary advances which, their proponents claimed, have 
rendered previous warships and maritime strategies obsolete? 
The ongoing analysis of sea power seems to have identified three 
fundamental reasons why a nation seeks to use the sea. Firstly, a nation may seek to 
obtain economic benefit through trade or the exploitation of resources. Secondly, a 
nation may seek military benefit by supporting friendly forces overseas. Finally, a 
nation may desire to protect its own security interests, sea-lines of communication 
(SLOC) and territory both in peace and war. Thus the use of the sea is not an end 
in itself but directly concerned with the well-being of the nation as a whole. 
To be able to use the sea a nation must first exert a measure of 
control; sea power is the tool which enables them to achieve this control. In its 
broadest context sea power can include not only naval vessels and their embarked 
aircraft, but also many other factors including; merchant ships, fishing fleets, 
maritime industries, oceanographic research and shipbuilding. The phrase 'Maritime 
Power' is now gaining favour and more properly reflects the importance of a 
country's general maritime interests to its national security. 
Sea power cannot in general secure territorial objectives and cannot 
usually be decisive unless used against a maritime dependent state. However, sea 
power does contribute to efforts ashore and can influence their course and outcome. 
Captain Alfred T Mahan, one of the most influential of naval strategists of the 
nineteenth century, was probably the first to lay down the primary objective of sea 
power: that is, to make use of the sea for one's own purposes, including the securing 
of sea communications and their denial to the enemy.8 To be really effective though, 
this power must be wielded as part of an overall maritime strategy. 
7 
For a recent illustration of this type of argument, using the 
example of anti-ship guided weapons, see Mack A, fA Case Against the ANZAC 
Frigates' in Pacific Research, August 1989, p. 6. 
8 
Roskill S W, The Strategy of Sea Power - its development and 
application, Collins, London 1962, p 15. 
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Maritime Strategy 
Another well-known naval strategist, Sir Julian Corbett, seems to have 
expressed the concept of a maritime strategy most succinctly when he defined it as; 
" ... the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor."9 Or as 
Admiral Gretton was to put it at a later date; " ... a maritime strategy uses the sea to 
exploit geography to the advantage of (a) country and seeks to deny its advantages to 
the enemy."IO 
Within a classical maritime strategy a naval force can fulfil three basic 
roles in times of conflict. The first role, to obtain free use of the sea while denying it 
to an enemy is termed 'sea control'. Sea control or as it is sometimes termed, 'sea 
command' is rarely absolute but instead tends to be temporary and limited to 
particular localities. 
The second role, to deny free use of the sea to an enemy without 
necessarily being able to use it freely yourself is termed 'sea denial'. This has been 
the typical strategy of the weaker maritime power in confrontation with the larger. 
The third naval role is the projection of military power. This can 
comprise either the direct support of land and air operations by attacking targets 
ashore, or the completion of independent action at sea. 
Recent Conceptions 
In the more recent past interpretations of maritime strategy have 
identified additional roles for naval forces particularly during times of peace and 
tension. At the lowest rung there is the routine peacetime presence mission. Here 
naval forces are used simply as an expression of national interest in the particular 
operating region. In times of crisis however, these same naval forces can be used to 
9 
Corbett J S, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Conway 
Maritime Press, London 1972, p. 13. 
10 
Gretton P, Maritime Strategy, Cassell, London 1965, p. 3. 
9 
express national concern or at the highest level of crisis, actually as a show of force. 
These roles have been particularly important during the period of the Cold War, 
with the more powerful maritime nations using the presence of naval forces to 
respond to inadequate diplomacy or ambiguous messages with a flexible and obvious 
statement of intent. 11 
Recent interpretations have also had to cope with changes in 
geographic conceptions. Historically the sea has been thought of as being 
uncontrolled, the opposite of the situation occurring on land, which has always been 
politically controlled. N ow with the expanding quest for sea bed and ocean resources 
the importance of the sea for national economic security is increasing. Maritime 
nations therefore, are nowadays much more likely to be seeking to extend their 
ability to achieve sea control into their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ).12 
US Maritime Strategy 
The United States is the pre-eminent maritime power of recent times 
and took the leading role in the prosecution of the Gulf War. The maritime strategy 
of the United States Navy (USN) is therefore worthy of separate examination. 
Expanding on the three traditional naval roles the USN is now 
configured to provide four fundamental capabilities; control of the sea, projection of 
power ashore, nuclear deterrence and strategic sealift. The USN has wholeheartedly 
embraced the 'total force concept' in which the navy acts as part of the entire United 
States Armed Forces rather than as a separate entity. This concept aims to achieve 
cost efficient combat capability by utilising the unique strengths of each of the four 
US armed services. The USN has also regarded itself as a key player in the overall 
United States strategy of forward defence, with a significant, permanently deployed, 
forward presence. 
11 Sharpe, op cit. 
12 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted in 
1982 the concept of the EEZ. The EEZ may extend up to 200 nautical miles 
from the coast and within it the coastal state has sovereign rights for 
the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural 
resources. 
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In the early 1980's the USN adopted a plan for confronting the Soviet 
Union in a major war, short of outright nuclear war. In what was officially termed 
the 'Maritime Strategy', the USN planned offensive global operations to counter the 
Soviet Union. In particular, it was intended that naval strike forces would conduct a 
rapid and early forward deployment to establish sea control and counter a thrust by 
the Soviet Union into Europe. Forward operations were planned to prevent the 
Soviets overrunning the flanks of NATO and once Soviet naval forces were 
overcome would allow deep strikes against Soviet offensive forces in central Europe. 
Thus naval power would be able to directly affect events on land.13 The Maritime 
Strategy was often summarised by the words; " ... forward, global, allied and 
joint(service )'.14 
The threat for which the USN had planned had some parallels with the 
situation arising from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In both cases a land power with 
large well- equipped forces had invaded a friendly area. Thus large land forces were 
needed to defend and liberate the area and these could only be supplied by sea. 
The USN was in a good position to use this planning experience in relation to the 
Gulf War. 
THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER AND CRITICISMS OF SEA POWER 
As previously noted the world today appears to be undergoing change 
at a more rapid rate than ever before, fuelled by dramatic and constant advances in 
science and technology and ever higher human expectations. The unpredictable 
nature of developments is already making the management of change one of the 
most consuming of political activities.15 
13. For a more thorough discussion of USN plans see Friedman N, The 
US Maritime strategy, Jane's Publishing, London 1988. 
14 
Ibid., p. 3. 
15 
For a useful discussion on the management of change see 
Boothby D, 'Maritime change in developing countries: the implications for 
naval arms control' in Fieldhouse R, Security At Sea - Naval Forces and 
Arms Control, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 77. 
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This dynamic transformation is affecting all aspects of modern life, but 
it is particularly influencing traditional perspectives of national security. Of specific 
concern is the fear that the security challenges of tomorrow will not reflect current 
concerns and thus the structure and practice of current armed forces. Maritime 
thinking in general and naval forces in particular are not immune from these 
challenges and questions are now arising over the continuing utility of sea power in 
the new strategic environment. 
End of the Cold War 
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
the conception of the threat facing the West has required considerable readjustment. 
The scale of change is well illustrated by the Gulf War where the easing of US/Soviet 
tensions allowed the redeployment of not only land and air forces from the 
European Theatre but also naval forces formerly considered sacrosanct.16 Thus a 
number of nuclear attack submarines (SSN), previously required to trail Soviet 
ballistic missile submarines, were able to be released for operations in direct support 
of Operation 'Desert Storm,.17 
Without the threat of the Soviet Union to provide a unifying purpose 
even the term 'the West' may require redefinition. Traditional alliances may no 
longer have the stature that they have received in the past. Former 'special allies' of 
the United States cannot simply assume that their privileged status will continue. IS 
With the decline in the Soviet threat the United States will also find it 
more difficult to use the Soviets as a justification for foreign bases. Third-world 
countries will increasingly perceive the US as unrestrained by a balancing threat and 
will be less likely to accept infringements of their own sovereignty. 
16 
Roberts J, 'Going in Harm's Way - The us Navy in the Light of 
the Gulf Crisis', in DEFENCE, March 1991, p. 28. 
17 
Operation 'Desert Storm' describes the Coalition offensive 
against Iraq that took place between 17 January and 28 February 1991. 
18 
For an assessment of the change in Australia's status from a 
'special ally' of the United states to 'just another trade competitor' see 
Button J, 'Brand New Day' in Time Magazine, April 6 1992, p. 13. 
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Local Conflicts Rather Than Global 
The end of the old world order does not however, mean the arrival of 
a new era of peace and stability under the magnanimous leadership of the United 
States. Without the international competition between the two former power blocs, 
conflicts may tend to be defined on a local or regional basis rather than as elements 
of a wider global struggle. Without the direction of the Soviet Union, former client 
states will become increasingly independent and unpredictable. We may therefore 
see the beginning of a more complicated and confusing situation with not just 
political, but also ethnic and religious tensions coming to the fore. 
These regionalised conflicts are already well in evidence in many areas 
of the globe.19 They are usually internal struggles and though often protracted, have 
few lines of communication extending overseas and hence few vulnerabilities to the 
application of maritime pressure.20 Thus, there is a strong argument that traditional 
forms of sea power will have little role to play in most of these situations. 
Collective Security 
Collective security and its apparent advantages became a popular topic 
in the aftermath of the Gulf War. However, with the rapid withdrawal of 
superpower military forces from overseas, what is more likely is that individual 
nations will feel obliged to make a more substantial contribution to their own 
security.21 When it comes to another country providing aid, the actual cost of 
providing assistance versus the expected gain will be taken into account more than 
. ever. With states following their own diverse national interests, economic rationalism 
19 Examples include current conflicts in the former Soviet Union, 
Balkan states, Iraq, Cambodia, Central America etc. 
20 
It is in a protracted war, that the economic considerations of 
a nation'S dependency upon vulnerable sea lines of communication weigh 
most heavily. 
21 
This trend is particularly evident in the Asia/Pacific region, 
where most of the ASEAN nations, Korea and Japan, are all increasing 
expenditure on defence. This is in spite of United states assurances that 
a substantial presence will remain in the region. See 'USN to stay on in 
Asia/Pacific' and 'Options for Defence' in Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 
February 1992, p. 282 and p. 293. 
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and political expediency will almost certainly assume precedence over moral issues. 
This point of moral or economic objectives, was certainly at issue in the 
Gulf War22 and as Professor Ken Booth has noted: 
" ... few would-be aggressors would surely repeat Saddam's major blunder of 
committing blatant aggression in an area of vital interest for the industrialised 
world. ,,23 
Level and Type of Threat 
One of the most common criticisms of Western maritime power, and 
the USN in particular, has been that it has always concentrated on the 'worst case' 
military threat; global conflict with the Soviet Union, to justify its existence.24 This 
concentration has been at the expense of the more likely conflicts such as low-level 
contingencies in the third-world. 
With the maritime forces of the former Soviet Union in disarray large 
budget items such as SSN s are now seen as having far fewer employment options in 
the USN. 25 The USN has already been directed to react to these trends and is being 
forced to reduce overall fleet combatant numbers.26 Similarly, many recent naval 
missions now require radical reassessment. Regional adversaries are not likely to be 
able to concentrate sufficient naval force for effective open ocean operations. Thus 
the USN's number one warfighting priority of the 1980's, anti-submarine warfare, is 
now regarded as having much reduced relevance in likely future regional conflicts 
22 
See Beyer L, 'The World Closes In' in Time Magazine, August 20 
1990, p. 15. 
23 
Booth K, 'The 'New World Order' and the Future of Naval Power', 
in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute - November 1991. p. 21. 
24 
Gretton M, 'The American Maritime Strategy: European 
Perspectives and Implications' in RUSI Journal, Spring 1989, p. 19. 
25 
Recent reports indicate the scrapping of plans to develop the 
very capable, but very expensive 'Seawolf' SSN past one unit. See Jane's 
Defence Weekly 29 February 1992, p. 339. 
26 
Hyde J, 'DoD's Heavy Hitters Converge on Hill; Congress Eyes 
Deeper Personnel Cuts', in Armed Forces JOURNAL International, April 1992, 
p. 8. 
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and has been superseded by power projection as the primary fleet mission.27 
For many small and medium-sized nations the possession of capabilities 
able to respond to the likely types of security threat is also causing concern. Though 
military security is a consideration, there are other more likely threats such as 
terrorism, drug-smuggling and illegal immigration that produce more pressing security 
problems. These non-defence threats are reported to be increasing in many areas of 
the world's oceans.28 Conventional, highly capable, maritime forces may be relevant 
to some of these issues but perhaps only to a limited extent.29 
Reduction in Available Resources 
The economic lure of the so-called 'peace dividend' has come at an 
opportune time for the West. The worldwide recession combined with the reduction 
in East/West tensions has brought sharp cuts to defence budgets and a close scrutiny 
of the overall defence establishment. Big defence spending is increasingly seen as 
counterproductive. 
Though all arms of the defence forces have taken reductions, naval 
elements exhibit particular vulnerabilities in cost-cutting exercises. Warships are 
extremely expensive to build, arm, crew, maintain and eventually replace. They have 
been increasing in cost at a rate far exceeding the general rate of inflation.3D 
Warships also take many years to design and build, meaning that they must be built 
27 Phillips-Beauden E, 'At Sea with the New World Order' in 
Defense & Diplomacy, Oct/Nov 1991, p. 51. 
28 
See Zimmerman S, 'Maritime Patrol Presents a Varied Menu of 
Choices in Armed Forces JOURNAL International, January 1992, p. 40. 
29 
See Mack, op cit., p. 7. 
30 
The inflation rate for navies tends to be worse than it is for 
armies because navies are more capital intensive. Air Force inflation 
rates are even greater but achieve less visibility because of lower unit 
cost. See Till G, Modern Sea Power, Brassey's Defence Publishers, London 
1987, p. 10. 
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in anticipation of future need, rather than as a reaction to current events.31 
On budgetary grounds alone there has been and will continue to be 
increasing public resistance to the purchase of major warships.32 The widespread 
domestic opposition to New Zealand's purchase of the ANZAC Frigate well 
illustrates this trend.33 
Spread of Arms to the Tbird-World 
Third-world countries, though economically poor have often managed 
to acquire considerable capability in military terms. The extent of the change that 
has taken place in the last few decades can be easily observed in the massive all 
arms effort that was required to remove Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. In stark contrast, 
the deployment of a single commando carrier, HMS BULWARK, was enough to 
deter Iraq from a similar invasion in 1961.34 
The possession of effective guided anti-ship weapons is now 
commonplace. This capability, combined with the use of relatively cheap sea mines 
apparently places the realistic potential to exert sea denial within easy grasp of even 
militarily small nations.35 Further, adding to the threat is the proliferation of 
31 For example, project planning for the new destroyer to replace 
the Charles F Adams Class DDG in Australian naval service began in 1988, 
Government approval will not follow until 1999. Actual building is due to 
commence in 2001 with the first vessel in service in 2006. With an 
expected service life of 30-40 years the ship will still be expected to be 
capable almost 60 years after it was initially conceived. 
32 
Due to budgetary constraints almost all Western European 
navies have declined both in numbers of ships and tonnage afloat over the 
last few decades. The decline has been up to 50% in some cases. See Till 
G, op cit, p. 12. 
33 
An opinion poll taken in early 1989 showed that more than 70% 
of New Zealanders failed to see why the government should spend over $NZ1 
billion on frigates when at the same time it was cutting expenditure on 
education and social welfare. Quoted in Cheeseman G 'The Frigate Saga 
Continues' in Pacific Research, May 1989, p. 11. 
34 
Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, 'The Reach and Scope of Maritime 
Power', presentation to the Royal United Services Institute 15 March 1990, 
p. 12. 
35 
In 1991 72 countries had a combined inventory exceeding 20000 
anti-ship missiles. By 1997 the threat is expected to expand to 100 
countries and more than 40000 missiles. Source - General Dynamics 
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bacteriological and chemical warheads, to which, it has been argued, naval forces are 
particularly vulnerable.36 The acquisition of a capacity to prevent operations by an 
adversary at sea is already the central maritime strategy of several developing 
nations.37 
Utility of Military Power 
The expense of employing military power may well outweigh the 
benefits that will accrue from its use.38 This observation does not just apply to the 
logistic cost. As noted above, warships are expensive and represent a considerable 
investment in international prestige. With the proliferation of anti-ship weapons, 
each capable of achieving a relatively 'cheap kill', it will often not be politically 
acceptable to risk such a 10ss.39 
Politically-imposed operational constraints were well in evidence in the 
Western forces involved in the Gulf War and have often been noted in the naval 
components of other recent wars including the Falklands and IranlIraq conflicts.40 
To maintain public support in the Gulf War there was a real need to keep casualties 
to a minimum, hence the refusal to sanction an amphibious landing despite intense 
lobbying from the US Marine Corps (USMC). To use another Gulf example, 
Australian ships were at first limited only to operations in the relatively secure Gulf 
Marketing Department, Rolling Airframe Missile brochure. 
36 
Phillips-Beauden, op cit., p. 53. 
37 
For example India and Indonesia have both publicly admitted 
that they are structuring their forces to fulfil, at least in some 
circumstances, a sea denial strategy. See Stevens D, 'Seapower and the 
Chinese/Indian Naval Expansion' in Journal of the Australian Naval 
Institute, October 1990, p. 17. 
38 Booth K, op cit. 
39 
Recent demonstrations of the damage that guided weapons can 
inflict on large naval vessels include the sinking of HMS SHEFFIELD by the 
Argentine Air Force in 1982 and the attack on USS STARK by Iraq in 1987. 
See also Mack, op cit., p. 6. 
40 
See Till G, op cit., p. 16. 
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of Oman. Later when operations were extended to the Arabian Gult-1 the 
Australian ships were still prevented from being used in the higher threat areas close 
to Iraq.42 
Crisis Control 
Navies have traditionally played particularly useful roles in times of 
tension and crisis.43 In these situations warships can hopefully prevent further 
escalation or perhaps stop the conflict starting in the first place. However, 
paradoxically, the advent of more complex technology can also make warships less 
controllable. 
As the speed of modern warfare increases, more decisions are being 
taken from human operators and left to computers. For crisis-control this has the 
potential to be de-stabilising, particularly in an air threat environment when 
automatic target engagement may take place as part of anticipatory self-defence. 
The institution of very restrictive Rules of Engagement may help to 
control this problem but cannot solve it. The shooting down of an Iranian airliner in 
1988, after misidentification by the USS VINCENNES, demonstrates the difficulties 
that will be faced more often in the future.44 
It has also been argued recently that without the support of a capable 
(and expensive) carrier battle group (CVBG), surface warships are now too 
vulnerable to risk in the face of guided-weapons and thus of little utility in a threat 
area. Furthermore, it has been claimed that individual surface warships will normally 
41 Throughout the Gulf War the term Arabian Gulf was used in 
preference to Persian Gulf in deference to the sensitivities of the Arab 
allies. 
42 
The author served on the staff of the Commander of the 
Australian contingent during the Gulf War. 
43 •. • • 
• See Allen C, The Use of Nav~es ~n Peacet~me, Amer~can 
Enterprise Institute - Studies in Defence Policy, Washington DC, undated. 
44 
Cordesman A, The Lessons of Modern War Volume II: the Iran-
Iraq War, Westview Press, San Francisco, 1991, p. 573. 
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lack the intrinsic offensive power necessary to provide an effective diplomatic 
presence in a crisis.45 
Social Concerns 
Throughout the developed world there is an increasing trend towards 
the acquisition of political power by groups outside the old political scheme. These 
special interest groups, whose primary purpose is to pursue domestic issues such as 
political, economic or environmental change, do not tend to support large military 
expenditure or the capability to use it overseas.46 A major challenge to all Defence 
Forces in the future will be simply to justify their continuing necessity.47 Following 
this trend the general naval potential to offensively project power will come under 
increasingly greater scrutiny. Arguments that naval vessels should be concentrated 
on coastal protection tasks are already common in many maritime nations. 
MARITIME ASPECfS OF THE GULF WAR 
In evaluating the strategic changes and criticisms of sea power that 
have been highlighted above it is now worthwhile to turn our attention to the Gulf 
War. The role of maritime power is worthy of particular examination because unlike 
land or air forces, maritime forces were fully employed both before, during and after 
the war and across the full spectrum of crisis and conflict; from the exertion of 
influence to large scale conventional war. The Coalition maritime force was also 
formed from the largest number of individual nations, with over 20 navies 
45 
Mack, op cit., p. 7. 
46 
See Warner D, 'Frigates ... They've got to be joking' in 
Pacific Defence Reporter, April 1989, p. 15. 
47 
See comment by the Australian Chief of Defence Force General P 
Gration in 'Forces must prove worth' in N T News, April 10 1992, p. 4. 
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contributing one or more vessels.48 
Iraqi Maritime Strategy 
Like many third-world countries, the Iraqi armed forces were highly 
politicised. The Ba'ath Party leadership under Saddam Hussein had never been able 
to fully trust the armed forces or allow them to become entirely professiona1.49 Thus 
the conduct and details of operations were in most respects directed from the highest 
levels while their political character affected all aspects and prevented the accurate 
collection and interpretation of data. 
The extent to which Hussein's strategic thinking was assisted by his 
military advisors or coloured by his own personal fears and objectives is open to 
debate. That Iraq seemed to have no coordinated plan other than to sit back and 
absorb punishment would tend to indicate that Hussein himself, accepted sole 
responsibility. 
Iraqi Objectives 
The actual invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 appears to have been 
primarily caused by a combination of Saddam Hussein's personal ambition, 
desperation over increasing financial problems, and from a maritime view, Iraq's 
longstanding desire to obtain better access to the Arabian Gulf. 
Iraq's coastline is only 58 km long and its sole major port at Basra is 
48 
Those countries providing naval units included the United states, 
United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, 
Australia, Argentina, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Bahrain. The USSR had naval units in the area but they did not take part in 
operations. Poland provided two hospital ships. 
49 
See Tusa F, 'Aspects of Arms Absorption in Arab Armies' in 
RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1990, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 
London 1990, p. 341. 
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only 30 kIn from Iran.50 Basra is situated inland on the Shatt al Arab waterway, 
which in turn has been the subject of a long-running border dispute with Iran. Thus, 
Iraq is severely restricted in access to sea communications. One of the major 
objectives for Iraq in its 1980 invasion of Iran was to gain full control over the Shatt 
al Arab and by acquiring the Iranian coastal province of Khuzistan secure Iraq's 
access to the Gulf.51 
At the end of the eight year Iran-Iraq War, Iraq controlled the Shatt al 
Arab waterway but not Khuzistan. The waterway itself was heavily silted, narrow, 
and littered with sunken ships. The war left Iraq heavily in debt and with an urgent 
need to increase oil revenue to help rebuild its shattered economy. Despite having 
built some additional smaller ports and overland pipelines Iraq clearly believed that 
its access to the Gulf remained inadequate and that its economic survival was at 
stake. Having failed to secure access in the east Iraq had little strategic choice but 
to turn west.52 Saddam Hussein appeared to see Kuwait as offering both the assets 
of one of the wealthiest nations in the Gulf, and ready-made port facilities. 
Iraqi Navy 
Iraq has long been anxious to be recognised as the principal naval 
power in the Gulf but it has not had a history of particular affinity with the sea. The 
Iraqi Navy is the smallest of the three services and is largely manned by conscripts. 
Like many other developing countries, Iraq possessed a number of reasonably 
capable fast patrol boats armed with surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). These 
vessels had been acquired from the USSR but Iraq had also looked further afield for 
supply and as part of its planned naval expansion, placed orders in Italy for a 
50 
Figure 1. provides a detailed view of the geo-political 
situation. 
51 
For a full list of Iraqi objectives see Cordesman A, op cit., p . • 
31. 
52 
For more detailed arguments regarding Iraq's strategic motivation 
see Patton J H, 'More Gulf War Lessons' in US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
April 1991, p. 52. 
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number of modern frigates and corvettes.53 With the possession of a relatively 
powerful fleet Iraq hoped to challenge Iranian dominance in the Arabian Gulf and 
thus exert influence throughout the Gulf region. 
Unfortunately for Iraqi maritime aspirations, at the time of the invasion 
of Kuwait the USSR was neither in a political nor financial position to consider 
support. 54 In addition the vessels on order from Italy had been embargoed since the 
Iran-Iraq war and had still not been delivered. As it eventuated Iraqi surface vessels 
played virtually no tangible role in the Gulf War. It could perhaps be argued that 
for a time the Iraqi Navy posed a threat as a 'fleet-in-being', but with its rapid 
destruction at the hands of coalition air strikes even this role was soon denied it.55 
By February 2 the USN was able to announce that the Iraqi Navy had; " ... passed into 
history'. 
Sea Denial 
Without a fleet capable of challenging Coalition superiority in the Gulf, 
Iraq was forced to revert to a denial strategy. The Iraqi strategy aimed to protect 
what it regarded as its most vulnerable flank, the Kuwaiti coast, from amphibious 
invasion. The first element of this strategy was the sea mine. Soon after the Iraqi 
invasion, fixed mine fields, comprising both moored-contact and influence mines, 
were laid in a crescent covering the approaches to the Kuwaiti coast. In perhaps the 
greatest Coalition failure of the war this minelaying was allowed to continue 
unopposed. Subsequently, the moored mines caused severe delays in Coalition 
activities while those that had broken free or were deliberately set adrift became a 
constant hazard and concern throughout the Gulf. 
From the Coalition point of view the Iraqi mining effort was very 
53 
Vlahos M, 'Middle Eastern, North African and South Asian 
Navies', in US Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1988, p. 58. 
54 Sharpe, op cit. 
55 
The 'fleet-in-being strategy' is the method by which an obviously 
second best navy adopts a passive defence, seeking not to pursue the opposing 
fleet in battle but instead, by simply maintaining its existence, threaten 
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successful. The US amphibious task force commander has been quoted as saying 
that any prospect of the 17 000 embarked marines storming ashore evaporated after 
the 17 February mine strikes on the US ships PRINCETON and TRIPOLI.56 
However, it is also worth noting that Saddam Hussein obviously thought differently. 
From his point of view it would seem that the Iraqi mine threat failed, while the 
Coalition amphibious threat remained quite real.57 
The second successful element in the Iraqi denial strategy was the 
positioning of coastal 'Silkworm' SSM batteries. These sites were well-camouflaged 
and comprised decoy sites as well as pre-prepared areas. The presence of these sites 
forced the coalition to provide constant air defence escorts to mine countermeasures 
(MCM) and amphibious forces in the northern Gulf. This escort was required even 
after the Iraqi Air Force and hence the threat from air-launched missiles, had been 
virtually eliminated. 
Despite continued attention from Coalition attack aircraft there was 
great difficulty in comprehensively countering the Silkworm sites. This was 
graphically demonstrated by the 25 February attack, albeit unsuccessful, on USS 
MISSOURI, almost at the end of the conflict. 58 
One further Iraqi operation that may have had a denial motive was the 
deliberate creation of an oil slick released from the Sea Island offshore oil-loading 
terminal. By opening the terminal's control valves the Iraqis were apparently 
attempting to disable the desalination plants on the Saudi Arabian coast. However, 
the slick also had the potential to limit inshore operations by surface forces and 
prevent an amphibious assault. Though the initial formation of the slick was not 
prevented, it was stopped from growing by a swift attack by USN aircraft which shut 
56 See Evans D E, 'With the Army and Air Force' in 
Institute Proceedings, June 1991, p. 64. 
57 
US Naval 
Some 10 Iraqi Divisions were tied to the coast to defend against 
an amphibious landing. See Friedman N, 'The Seaward Flank', in US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, July 1991, p. 83. 
58 
MISSOURI while conducting a naval gunfire support mission was 
engaged by at least two Silkworm missiles. One missile splashed just after 
launch, the other was shot down by HMS GLOUCESTER. 
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off the oil flow. 
Subsequently the USN was forced to expend considerable assets in 
monitoring the oil slick. Aircraft were tasked to report on the slick's progress several 
times a day and great efforts were made to place Coalition containment actions in a 
favourable environmental light. 
In common with Iraq's overall strategy the maritime element was 
characterised by an inability to take the initiative and react in any organised way to 
Coalition activities. The preoccupation with 'digging in' and trying to ride out the 
Coalition onslaught was doomed from the start to failure. Had Iraq attempted to 
make better and coordinated use of its assets it could have caused many more 
headaches for the Coalition. 
Despite the Coalition's undoubted preponderance in maritime power it 
was hampered by the necessity to limit both materiel and human casualties. An 
early success by Iraq against even one of the Coalition's naval vessels would have 
meant not only an important propaganda victory but would almost certainly have 
caused all naval forces to move away from Kuwait and further down the Gulf. There 
they would have been less able to individually project power. If the success had 
been against a minor Coalition member it might even have resulted in the 
withdrawal by that member of other engaged forces. 
Coalition Maritime Strategy 
The contribution of the Coalition maritime forces was essential to the 
war effort for the simple reason that for most of the Coalition members the war was 
overseas and virtually all heavy equipment had to come by sea. The Coalition was 
indeed fortunate that several members had for some time maintained a forward 
naval presence.59 By having powerful naval forces on station and ready from the 
59 
The USA, UK and France had maintained a permanent naval 
presence in the region since well before the Iran/Iraq War. 
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outset the Coalition was able to ensure that sea control in most areas was never 
seriously challenged. 
Coalition Objectives 
Unlike the situation in Vietnam, the Coalition had a clearly defined 
aim and achievable objectives. Also unlike Vietnam, the military requirement to 
concentrate overwhelming force was accepted from the start. Though the primary 
political objective was the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait economic factors also played 
a major role. The United States had for a considerable time declared that 
guaranteed access to Gulf oil was a crucial component of its national security.60 This 
perception reflected not so much on the United States's own oil requirements as on 
those of its industrial partners in Asia and Europe. 
The Gulf region contains more than 50% of the world's proven oil 
reserves and is thus also critical to the stability of the world economy. The apparent 
danger of Iraq continuing its invasion to threaten Saudi Arabia and its own 
substantial proportion of oil reserves only served to reinforce the threat to global 
economic security and the need for significant international reaction. 
Initial Maritime Reactions 
Soon after the Iraqi invasion Saudi Arabia called for assistance under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. The provisions for collective self-defence provided a 
suitable justification for the deployment of outside military force.61 However, though 
the first military reactions were predominantly designed for the defence of Saudi 
Arabia another factor soon came into play. Closely following the initial resolution, 
calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) implemented a series of mandatory economic sanctions banning the trade of 
60 
For a history of declared United states interests see Hickman W, 
'Confrontation in the Gulf: Unintended consequences' in us Naval War College 
Review, Winter 1991, p. 55. 
61 
Article 51 reads in part; "Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence ... ". 
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all goods to and from Iraq. 
To enforce and support this trade embargo and with the primary 
backing of the United States, a multi-national naval force (MNF) was formed. From 
within this grouping the local US Commander, COMIDEASTFOR62, became 
defacto Commander of the Maritime Interception Force (MIF) with overall 
responsibility for coordinating the MIF operations. Though never formally 
constituted and having no United Nations standing the MNF provided a convenient 
rallying point for those countries choosing to become actively involved but not 
necessarily wishing to commit forces on the ground. 
The provision of naval units rather than ground or air forces offered 
some significant advantages. Firstly, naval forces tend to be at a higher state of 
combat-readiness than other armed forces and normally operate fully ammunitioned 
and supplied. Secondly, naval forces are not dependent upon politically sensitive 
shore support in a foreign country. Thirdly, naval forces have comprehensive 
communications suites and can in theory at least, be controlled by government at all 
times. Fourthly naval vessels are inherently mobile and can therefore be withdrawn 
or committed as required. Finally, it was more politically acceptable in countries 
such as Australia and Argentina to only provide naval units. At least initially, ships 
were truly required to enforce the trade sanctions while aircraft or troops would only 
have been suitable for actual conflict. 
As the MNF was not a formal body, allocation of forces was on the 
basis of loose association with the USN command, in this way individual governments 
still retained full command and control. Countries with a more substantial presence 
in the area such as the United States, United Kingdom and France allocated a small 
proportion of deployed vessels to the MNF while the others remained on 
independent national operations. 
62 
Commander Middle Eastern Forces. 
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Maritime Interdiction 
The MNF fleet maintained an average of some 80 vessels in theatre 
and of these at least 20 were dedicated to MIF operations. The immediate objective 
of the MIF was to enforce the trade embargo against Iraq. To do this the MIF 
required to intercept, challenge, and at times visit, board and search merchant vessels 
to determine their cargoes, destination and last port of call. 
Despite Iraqi criticism that this was in effect a 'starvation blockade' this 
was not the Coalition intention. Instead the embargo primarily sought to deprive 
Iraq of its oil export income and international support for its military forces. Though 
Iraq is virtually self-sufficient in small arms and ammunition it does not have the 
capability to manufacture spares for more sophisticated systems. A large proportion 
of the Iraqi fleet of MiG 21 aircraft for example, were in Yugoslavia being repaired 
when the embargo began.63 
The legality of the embargo was initially questioned, not least because 
a blockade has been defined as an act of war and the overt act of a declared 
belligerent nation. The Coalition forces had not declared war and were ostensibly in 
place to defend Saudi Arabia. Thus, some countries such as Australia and Canada 
initially planned to restrict their ships to monitoring observance of the sanctions and 
would not allow an active role in stopping ships or checking cargoes.64 
On 25 August however, the UNSC agreed to Resolution 665 which 
called for; " ... a11 UN member states with navies to take all necessary measures to stop 
ships in the Gulf area and check cargoes and destinations." This resolution was 
interpreted by the US and most other Coalition nations as allowing the use of 
necessary and proportional force as an exercise of collective self-defence under the 
63 
See Friedman N, 'World Naval Developments, 1990' in 
Institute Proceedings, Naval Review Issue 1991, p. 177. 
64 
US Naval 
See Lynch T, 'Canada in the Gulf - Operation Friction' in Navy 
International, November 1990, p. 391, and Stevens D, Operation DAMASK -
The RAN Contribution to the Gulf War' in Australia's Navy 1991-92, AGPS, 
Canberra 1991, p. 15. 
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UN Charter. 65 
As Ronzitti has argued in his treatise on the law of naval warfare, 
measures of economic warfare are not in themselves inconsistent with the right of 
self-defence.66 Thus the resolution effectively removed any ambiguity and silenced 
most of the remaining criticism. However, to further allay political sensitivities the 
actual term 'blockade' was deliberately never used by the Coalition when referring to 
the embargo.67 
Once instituted, the maritime embargo was extremely effective and no 
goods were able to enter Iraq by sea. The Coalition forces were unquestionably 
superior to the Iraqi Navy and a close blockade was not necessary. The MIF could 
easily control access to Iraq via the remote choke points of the Strait of Hormuz and 
Gulf of Aqaba. Other than the occasional sign of obstinacy by some of the merchant 
ships intercepted, Iraq did not attempt to cross the blockade.68 
The vast majority of boardings were carried out in the Red Sea. Here 
every vessel bound for the port of Aqaba in Jordan had to be boarded. This 
precaution was necessary because of Jordan's announced sympathies with Iraq and 
the likelihood that contraband would be moved from the port overland to Iraq, thus 
avoiding the embargo. In the Arabian Gulf however, seaborne traffic to and from 
Iraq and Kuwait virtually ceased with only the occasional Iraqi vessel coming to 
attention, usually returning empty from overseas. 
The Iraqi merchant fleet comprised only some 50 vessels and from the 
65 See Delery T, 'Away, the Boarding Party' in US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Naval Review Issue 1991, p. 66. 
66 • See Ronzitti N, The Law of Naval Warfare, Marinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Netherlands 1988, p. 4. 
67 
To avoid legal problems and troubles with neutral nations in 
neither of the two world wars was a blockade of Germany ever actually 
declared by the UK. See Roskill S W, Ope cit., pp. 107-110. 
68 
Iraqi merchant ships had been ordered by Saddam Hussein not to 
stop for boarding and search by Coalition forces. To force these ships to 
stop warning fire was initially used, later it was found to be more effective 
to insert boarding parties by helicopter and physically seize control of the 
ship. 
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very beginning of the crisis the movements of these were closely monitored by the 
US surveillance and intelligence network. However, the number of other merchant 
vessels plying the area was considerable and in the period August 1990 to April 1991 
over 9200 merchant ships were challenged, over 1200 boarded and at least 67 
diverted for carrying prohibited cargo.69 
The Coalition embargo could not achieve its fundamental objective of 
forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait for the simple reason that during the crisis Iraq was not 
fundamentally dependent upon imports. With rationing, Iraq could be virtually self 
sufficient in food and as Iraq was not engaged in offensive war it was not using up 
war material. Therefore, in the long term the economy might collapse but Iraq could 
not be completely choked. 
Military Sealift and Sea Lines of Communication 
Some of the most memorable initial images from the Gulf War were of 
heavy transport aircraft disgorging troops and supplies, yet despite the use of these 
aircraft more than 90% of material to support the US campaign still came by sea.1O 
For the Coalition as a whole the total is closer to 95%.11 On completion of the 
operation, with some of the urgency removed, over 95% of US cargo was sent back 
by sea.72 
Though US Air Force and other aircraft were flying into Saudi Arabia 
from the very beginning of the crisis they could not bring sufficient quantities of 
ordnance or fuel with them. The only oil refinery in the region able to produce 
aviation quality fuel was in Kuwait, while the massive amounts of ordnance required 
rendered air transport impractical. The Coalition Armoured Divisions were also not 
air transportable. 
69 
The USN in "Desert Shield"/"Desert Storm", p. vi. 
70 
Ibid., p. vi. 
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Wettern D, 'Euphoria hides shipping deficiencies' in Asia-
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The eventual success of 'Desert Storm' also owed much to the 
worldwide logistic prepositioning and enhancement of strategic sealift that the USN 
had undertaken in the 1980s. The strategic sealift requirement included both the 
initial surge capability and sustainment shipping for resupply. The assets from 
stockpiles onboard Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons in such places as Diego 
Garcia and Guam provided most of the essential fuels and cargo in the first weeks of 
the crisis. The US Military Sealift Command (MSC) delivered the first heavy ground 
equipment to Saudi Arabia on 15 August only eight days after the decision to deploy 
US forces. 
Overall, according to the USN, only 4.4% of the strategic sealift 
capability was used for the in-theatre support of naval forces?3 Naval forces by their 
very nature relied instead on self-sustained logistic support capability. 
It must be also be noted however, that the Coalition was very fortunate 
that Saudi Arabia had a suitable infrastructure,74 that an extended deployment 
period was available and that no major threat to the SLOC eventuated. While Iraq 
itself did not have the military capability to directly interfere, there were concerns 
that other countries might try to assist the Iraqi cause. 
Though perhaps not willing to risk overt action Libya had 
demonstrated in 1984 how a few mines deployed from a merchant ship could cause 
enormous disruption?5 The possible threat from this direction resulted in elements 
from the NATO naval formations NAVOCFORMED76 and STANAVFORCHAN77 
73 The USN in "Desert Shield"/"Desert storm", p. 62 . • 
74 Saudi Arabia had for the previous 20 years; " ••• been over-
building industrial, commercial and transportation facilities, including more 
than 30 air bases and eight modern port facilities." See The USN in "Desert 
Shield"/"Desert Storm", p. 52. 
75. In 1984 about 20 ground mines were covertly laid in the Red Sea 
causing damage to 18 different merchant ships and virtually closing the Red 
Sea for 6 weeks. The Libyan Ro-Ro vessel GHAT was the likely culprit. See 
Moore J, 'Red Sea mines a mystery no longer' in Jane's Naval Review, Jane's 
Publishing, London 1985, p. 64. In addition Libya possessed several 
submarines which could also have caused severe disruption to merchant 
traffic. 
76 
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patrolling Mediterranean shipping routes throughout the conflict.78 Though NATO, 
as an alliance, did not directly intervene in the Gulf War the patrols did act to 
protect shipping and guarantee freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean.79 
Other countries with pro-Iraqi or ambiguous leanings were also 
suspect. Yemen could have caused problems to shipping in the southern Red Sea, 
while Iran with its avowed anti-Western stance held a commanding position over the 
Strait of Hormuz. One of the most credible threats though, was terrorist activity, 
particularly against a shipping bottle-neck such as the Suez Canal. The prolonged 
blockage of the canal would have added some 3,500 miles to the transit of material 
from America with attendant delays and reduction in shipping capacity. Egypt 
initiated increased security precautions to prevent such an attack, particularly during 
the transit of high-value units. Daily minesweeping operations in the canal also 
became routine.80 
Power Projection and Conflict Operations 
In the Gulf War maritime forces undertook both direct support of land 
operations and independent action at sea. Surface combatants carried out aircraft, 
gunnery and missile strikes against land and sea targets, amphibious forces conducted 
landing exercises and feints to confuse Iraqi planning and the MCM forces cleared 
paths through the minefields. The USN was eventually to describe the operation as: 
" ... the most complex, fast moving, successful, major joint power projection 
operation in history.,,81 
77 
standing Naval Force Channel. 
78 See Wettern 0, 'Sea lines cause concern' in Asia-Pacific 
Defence Reporter, March 1991, p. 5. and NATO'S Sixteen Nations, May/June 
1991, p. 87. 
79 NATO does not have authority to deal with situations outside 
its borders. Instead the Western European Union (WEU) coordinated the 
military deployments of its member states. This was the first time in the 
history of the WEU that its military chiefs had met to organise specific 
military measures. 
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USN aircraft carriers formed the most obvious and effective instrument 
of power projection, offering the substantial advantages of long range, staying power 
and mobility. With the fortunate proximity of the USS INDEPENDENCE and USS 
EISENHOWER CVBGs the USN was able to provide sustainable combat capability 
within three-and-a-half days of the initial Iraqi invasion. For a considerable time 
these carriers provided the only air power fully available for action. 
The view of many in the USN and even General Schwarzkopf is that 
Saddam Hussein was deterred from continuing his invasion into Saudi Arabia by the 
immediate response of the carriers in establishing sea superiority.82 However, even 
if Saddam was not stopped at Kuwait because of the rapid arrival of the CVBGs and 
their power projection potential, he was at least forced to pause and rethink his 
strategy. This delay allowed the rapid deployment of ground and air forces to get 
under way and eventually remove the option of any further Iraqi expansion. 
Carriers by virtue of their positioning enjoyed other advantages over 
land-based air. Those in the Red Sea were able to strike targets in Western Iraq 
without having to fly over major concentrations of Iraqi surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs). While those carriers in the Arabian Gulf were closer to Iraq than any 
airfield ashore and thus able to deliver very high sortie rates. These details should 
not however, obscure some of the limitations that were also demonstrated. The Red 
Sea carriers for example, were heavily reliant on Air Force land-based tanker 
aircraft. It has been estimated that the sortie rate would have been reduced by more 
than two thirds had the carriers been forced to rely on organic tanking.83 
A previously untested tool of maritime power projection was the use of 
the Tomahawk Land-Attack-Cruise-Missile (TLAM) in strike warfare. These 
weapons were primarily used in situations where the risk to manned aircraft was 
deemed to be unacceptable. The TLAM had its most significant successes in 
destroying heavily defended targets in Iraq and in seriously degrading enemy air 
82 
See Schwarzkopf N, op. cit., p. 44. 
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defences.84 The success of the cruise-missile was seen by most commentators as a 
graphic demonstration of how advanced technology can achieve strategic and tactical 
advantage. 
Command Control and Communications 
The political and strategic direction of the Gulf War came initially from 
the UNSC. However, this direction was extremely limited and the United Nations 
did not, as it had done in Korea, provide a single UN Command. Thus it was only 
natural that the United States as the provider of the bulk of military forces would 
assume the role of Commander-in-Chief and Coalition coordinator. 
Though retaining national command, several of the Coalition navies did 
place their vessels under USN tactical control prior to the opening of hostilities. 
This provided a much tighter and more effective degree of control during combat. 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) were a particularly difficult area with a serious 
potential for misunderstandings to arise.85 
As each nation was working under its own political restrictions 
arranging coordinated action was at times difficult. Restrictions usually involved a 
prohibition on ships assuming a direct offensive role or imposing geographical limits 
on operations.86 These problems were circumvented by having restricted ships act as 
escorts and surveillance assets in the Strait of Hormuz and Southern Gulf. These 
were essential tasks but would have been a mis-employment of the more highly 
capable units of the major navies. 
Prior to 'Desert Storm' it was rare to find two USN carriers working 
together in an integrated command and control structure and claims had been made 
84 
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that any more would be too complex to operate effectively.87 Battle Force Zulu, the 
Arabian Gulf naval force, eventually comprised four carriers, their escorts and a 
large number of multinational forces, and no insurmountable problems developed. 
One of the most impressive features of the naval war in the Gulf was 
the way ships from different nations were able to operate together with such a 
remarkable degree of cooperation and that no 'blue-on-blue' engagements 
occurred.88 Many of the nations were either members of NATO or used NATO 
procedures but the ability to integrate without any previous experience was by no 
means inevitable. 
The smooth integration of the MNF and the international cooperation 
displayed, even without a formal structure, is in marked contrast to the experience 
ashore. In his preliminary report General Schwarzkopf stated that on land; 
"Establishment and implementation of Coalition command relationships were 
difficult ... national pride, politics and public perception ... resulted in formal 
command relationship structures which ... com&€licated rather than simplified 
the commands ability to execute the mission." 
MARITIME LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR 
Though not all areas of maritime strategy were tested during the Gulf 
War the maritime activities of Iraq and the Coalition did bring out a number of new 
and old lessons regarding the use of maritime power.90 Those points which follow 
should by no means be regarded as comprehensive but do serve to illustrate the 
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scope. 
Utility of Maritime Power 
Despite idealistic claims that war has become too costly to be used as 
an instrument of political policy, the Gulf War demonstrated that armed force still 
has a very real role to play in government thinking. Military forces will continue to 
be seen as a significant component of national power and prestige. It would also 
seem from the Gulf experience, that navies, despite their cost, remain a particularly 
flexible instrument in advancing political and economic security. 
Sea Denial 
Though the overall Iraqi strategy failed, the lessons drawn from the 
Iraqi experience will not be lost on other third-world countries. The Iraqi minefields 
in particular, demonstrated once again how relatively simple measures can require 
significantly greater countermeasures in response. Echoing the lessons of earlier 
wars, the US naval commander, Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur, made the comment: 
"Low-technology mines are one of the most cost-effective weapons in 
existence. ,,91 
The effective use of such low-cost weapons combined with the 
possession of more capable guided weapons, will increase the ability of smaller 
powers to influence what goes on in their own coastal regions. The Gulf War 
demonstrated that in regional conflicts western powers are less willing to accept 
losses. If a Third-World country can achieve a realistic sea denial capability it may 
reduce the likelihood of foreign intervention or, by inflicting disproportionate losses, 
ensure that further intervention will be deterred. 
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Sea Control 
Despite the reduced threat to SLOC in the open ocean, the possession 
of local sea control has again been shown to be a primary prerequisite for the 
successful projection of maritime power. With the notable exception of the Kuwaiti 
coast, the Coalition possessed control in most sea areas from the beginning of the 
crisis and fortunately did not have to fight for it. 
Without sea control in the central and southern Gulf the Coalition 
build-up and final offensive could not have taken place. Without guaranteed sea 
control, foreign ships would have been less likely to accept charter. With sea control, 
important Middle East commercial trade routes were kept open and oil continued to 
be exported out of the Gulf throughout the conflict. 
Maritime Interdiction 
Though the UN embargo failed to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait 
the operations were technically successful and did reduce Iraqi war preparedness?2 
As stated by Admiral F B Kelso, USN Chief of Naval Operations: 
"Interdiction of Iraqi seaborne trade ... cut enemy resupply, damrned their 
will to fight and significantly impacted Iracjs economic health"? 
The cooperative operations of the MNF also had important political 
implications. The embargo provided a reasonable alternative to war while at the 
same time expressing international concern over the Iraqi invasion. The 
international nature of the Coalition was continuously stressed in public 
pronouncements concerning interceptions and boardings. The use of large numbers 
of Coalition ships in single boarding operations could hardly be classed as economy 
92. According to General Schwarzkopf, overall commander of the 
Coalition forces, Iraq lost 90% of its imports, 100% of its exports and 
had its GNP cut in half. See Schwarzkopf N, 'A Tribute to the Navy-
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93 
The USN in "Desert Shield"/"Desert Storm", p. ii. 
36 
of effort but politically was considered an important way of demonstrating resolve.94 
The embargo also had the indirect effect of providing a secure foundation for the 
future conflict by allowing countries time to acclimatise themselves before finally 
committing forces to offensive action. 
Power Projection 
The USN CVBG was yet again shown to be a flexible and effective 
asset for power projection. The embarked carrier air wings were vastly superior both 
in training and quality of equipment to any of the Middle Eastern air forces. Thus 
the arrival of the carriers immediately stabilised the situation, reducing Iraq's military 
options and exposing their forces to attack. The carriers were also a very visible and 
practical method of demonstrating US resolve to defend Saudi Arabia and other 
friendly Gulf countries. 
Despite claims to the contrary, carriers and their escorts are relatively 
difficult to successfully attack. It has been noted for example, that a single 'Scud' 
SSM armed with a chemical warhead could have put a land airbase out of action. In 
contrast a carrier, despite the threat of guided weapons, might well have been 
immune, not only because of its layered defences, but also because Iraq lacked the 
means to locate surface ships and track them well enough to attack them?5 
Another important point is that warships of whatever nationality were 
sovereign territory, unlike the land bases which ultimately were under the control of 
the host country. USN ships could thus possess nuclear weapons which could not 
otherwise be allowed ashore and out of national control. Without useable weapons 
in theatre the US could not have realistically provided the implicit threat of 'terrible 
escalation' should Saddam resort to chemical or biological weapons?6 
94 For example the boarding of the single Libyan sponsored 'Peace 
Ship' IBN KHALDOON was effected through the combined efforts of 7 USN, Royal 
Navy and Australian ships. A Danish warship had also volunteered but was 
unable to reach the scene in time. 
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As noted by Admiral Dunn of the USN: 
"With nations understandably sensitive about foreign bases on their SOJl and 
nervous about foreign military aircraft overhead, only naval forces can 
guarantee an immediate response in support of allies.,,97 
The Gulf War has also demonstrated the way the cruise-missile has 
extended the reach and flexibility of sea power. Though the actual number of 
TLAMs deployed was small they did show that they could achieve delivery accuracy 
as good as, if not better than a manned aircraft. By being unmanned, weapons such 
as the TLAM also had a psychological effect that may well have been in excess of 
the physical effect of the warhead. The cruise-missile is still not a complete solution 
however, and retains the major disadvantages of cost and lack of flexibility when 
compared to manned aircraft. The TLAM, for example, cannot be recalled after 
launch or engage targets of opportunity?8 
The other guided weapon that achieved significant success was the 
helicopter launched air-to-surface missile (ASM). This weapon was effectively 
deployed from both Royal Naval (RN) and US Marine helicopters and was 
responsible for a significant proportion of Iraqi navallosses?9 In terms of weapons 
expended and immediate effectiveness the helicopter launched ASM proved more 
effective than both unguided and precision ordnance delivered by fixed-wing 
aircraft. IOO 
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Sea Lift 
The Coalition sealift capability was vital to the assembly and 
sustainment of such a large force. Air transport in contrast served as a 
supplementary rather than a substitute service. To illustrate the difference in 
capability, at the peak period of deployment on January 2 1991, the US MSC had 
172 ships underway.IOI Any three of these ships carried as much cargo as the 
combined capacity of the total US airlift. 
There were however, weaknesses in the logistics train. For example 
there were too few crews to man the US reserve-force ships, while even before 
January 16 there were several instances of merchant crews refusing to sail for the 
Gulf with military stores embarked.I02 If any cargo ship had actually been sunk or 
damaged there may well have been difficulties in finding sufficient crews to maintain 
the necessary level of supply. 
Moreover, US shipping requirements had been calculated on trans-
Atlantic voyages to resupply Europe, the much longer voyage to the Gulf required 
many more ships for the same transport capacity. Post-war US reports admit that 
US sealift fell behind schedule and, that there was a shortage of pre-positioned 
supplies. I03 Because of hull shortages both the US and UK also had to rely on 
chartered, flag of convenience, ships for much of their cargo carrying.I04 The MSC 
for example carried only three quarters of the seaborne cargo on prepositioned ships, 
fast sealift ships and vessels activated from the Ready Reserve Force. IOS Chartered 
merchant ships made up the difference. 
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Technology 
The Gulf War has for many analysts demonstrated the strategic and 
tactical advantages of high technology. One of the more commonly quoted axioms 
from the war was the claim that; "high technology works' and that this would cause 
major reassessments of third-world military strategies.106 A particular example used 
was the success of helicopter-launched ASM against fast patrol boats, thus, according 
to some, rendering these vessels and hence most small navies, obsolete.107 Such 
shallow analysis only serves to cloud more reasoned examinations. It would 
presumably be just as true to say that "low technology worked' if you are referring to 
the Iraqi mining effort. 
Though important, the advantage of high technology should not be 
overstressed. Precision weapons are only as good as the mapping, tracking and 
intelligence information supporting their targeting. The acquisition of this 
information can involve many assets and require significant effort. lOS 
Historical experience has shown that the technology advantage is at 
best transient, while technology itself is simply the next level down below tactics, 
strategy and grand strategy. Technological advances have been evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary and do not, as a rule, mean that the fundamental principles of 
strategy have altered.109 What is more usual is that advances in countermeasures 
proceed at the same pace and that a 'see-saw' battle develops on the tacticallevel.110 
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January much work had to be done to map and plan the missile missions. 
The mapping of the theatre that the USN had achieved during the previous 
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useful, was insufficient for targets in Iraq. 
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Naval Presence 
The presence of Coalition naval forces in the Middle East prior to the 
Gulf War had important implications for the future conduct of the war. Without the 
experience of an established presence to draw on, Coalition forces would have taken 
much longer to adapt to local conditions. Without the previous presence of naval 
forces, regional nations would have been much more reticent in providing the 
increased support infrastructure required. 
Though the war has now ended MNF vessels remain on patrol. In this 
way pressure is being maintained on Iraq to comply with the provisions of the 
ceasefire agreement. As ground and air forces deployed overseas diminish due to 
political and economic pressures the naval presence role will assume even more 
importance as a highly visible means of demonstrating capability, interest and if 
required, direct support. 
Joint and Combined Military Operations 
Few if any nations can now hope to ensure sufficient military capability 
across the entire range of military options available to an opponent. As it 
eventuated, even the United States would have had difficulty absorbing the cost of 
the Gulf War had it not been for the international contribution. 
Joint operations at all levels in the Gulf helped to provide an effective 
combination of force components, and strengthen diplomatic cohesiveness.lll Naval 
cooperation is regularly practised around the world and is generally seen as an 
important means of strengthening defence ties. As already noted it also has the 
advantage of infringing no foreign territory. The Gulf War has already been seen by 
many analysts as an example of the type of joint power projection operations that 
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may be anticipated in the post-Cold War world.112 
The GuH War In Perspective 
Before deciding how relevant the lessons of the Gulf War are to future 
maritime strategy and roles, the war itself must be put into its correct strategic 
perspective. Like the Falklands War before it, the Gulf War can be seen as the 
result of a unique set of circumstances and care must be taken when drawing up 
conclusions. Certainly, future conflicts may not occur in regions where 
comprehensive friendly support is available and where a six month period is available 
for an offensive build-up. 
The pace of change in the last few years has shown that the world's 
geo-political climate will continue to be unpredictable. There are however some 
general and identifiable strategic principles which can provide a reliable foundation, 
regardless of future directions. Some of these key elements, which will characterise 
the future strategic environment, are as follows: 
The high levels of destruction inherent in modern weapons, the 
interdependency of the world economy and the lack of a serious military 
challenger to the United States, means that the likelihood of global or 
intercontinental warfare will continue to decrease. 
Without the need to provide a strategic balance to the Soviet Union, the West 
and the US in particular may be able to base decisions on a more objective 
view of national interests. However, economic interdependency will still mean 
that major economic powers such as the US and Japan cannot afford to 
remain isolated from international developments. 
Worldwide commerce and hence the importance of sea lines of 
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communication will not diminish. In areas of economic growth such as the 
Asia/pacific region, many nations have large and expanding national-flag 
merchant and fishing fleets and have an increasing concern for the security of 
seaborne trade. 
Emerging global powers like China, India and Japan are including a large 
naval element in force expansion. These nations are likely to be more 
prepared to make use of maritime operations to influence and control events, 
at least within their own region. 
Internal conflicts will remain and in a multi-polar world, the need for 
developing nations to assert their statehood and independence means that 
rivalry, complexity and uncertainty will still arise. 
Regional conflicts will provide the most likely area for international military 
involvement and perhaps an increasing requirement to contribute to UN or 
other collective security arrangements, albeit on a smaller scale than in the 
Gulf. 
The proliferation of navies has provided the capability for local conflicts to 
extend outside local boundaries, thus increasing the risk that the reach and 
scope of that conflict may be extended.113 
In the West there will be continuing pressures to reduce overall defence costs, 
eliminate redundancies and economise on operations. Elsewhere, in areas of 
economic growth there will be a general rise in technological competence 
including defence capability. 
Worldwide interest in exploiting offshore areas for economic and strategic 
defence purposes will continue and expand. 
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THE FUTURE FACE OF MARITIME POWER 
To cope with the unpredictable nature of future circumstances and 
contingencies the elements of military force must be highly adaptable. Flexibility and 
versatility are the key issues but are unfortunately very difficult to quantify. For a 
fleet, flexibility will most probably mean a mix of mobility and the ability to carry a 
wide variety of weapons. Though future naval development will vary widely 
according to individual security perspectives and economic circumstances the 
preceding analysis has at least identified some common trends. 
Naval Vessels 
Despite the relatively high cost of naval vessels the priority placed on 
maritime development by smaller states is likely to remain high.114 As an example, 
in South East Asia, far from Europe and where the fear of Chinese and Vietnamese 
expansionism remains, there appear few signs of the 'peace dividend' so vigorously 
pursued in the West. Other than in the Philippines the defence budgets of all other 
ASEAN nations have increased during the past three years.115 
In the West if further reductions in naval forces cannot be achieved 
without reducing commitments, then declining construction budgets dictate more 
affordable ships. If however, lower unit costs cannot be achieved, then the smaller 
number of remaining ships must be made to last longer. Combatant capabilities will, 
more than ever, need to keep pace with an evolving threat and changing mission 
requirements. Part of future design will therefore be durability, both in material and 
technology. 
Modern ship builders, such as the German firm Blohm and Voss, have 
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for several years been stressing flexibility in their basic designs. This approach has 
already achieved substantial export success.116 To allow for future variations in role 
and threat, containerisation of weapons and other ship systems is another option 
gaining increasing favour.117 Also being widely fitted is the vertical launch system, 
which can handle a variety of different ordnance in the same basic design. 
For the USN the reduction or complete elimination of overseas basing 
will mean that very long endurance is likely to be emphasised. With reduced assets 
USN forces may no longer be tied to specific regions. More emphasis will be placed 
on the ability to move between theatres and concentrate when necessary. The 
priority on expensive assets such as SSNs will continue to reduce. Though SSNs 
have proved useful in limited wars such as the Falklands, other types of vessels are 
more flexible in local wars. 
Endurance, habitability and seakeeping will also be major 
considerations for those nations wishing to conduct effective patrols of large EEZs. 
High speed and a capable weapon fit will also be needed if the vessel is to have 
credibility in enforcing state interests. 
The patrol craft has been and will continue to be the primary asset of 
the smaller navy. The number of missile armed patrol boats will continue to increase 
as smaller nations seek to acquire credible sea denial capabilities.118 The numbers 
of these small combatants will also increase in larger navies because of budget 
constraints. At the same time smaller vessels will have difficulty avoiding increases in 
cost as they attempt to attain the necessary level of capability performance to meet 
modern threats. 
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Sea Denial 
The trend to powerfully arm third-world countries will continue, 
assisted by arms manufacturers and governments seeking to reduce development 
costs by ensuring export. Western navies will however, continue to hold the lead in 
technical and operational matters for some time and larger navies could normally 
deploy sufficient strength to obtain local sea control against a third-world threat. But 
with an increasingly sophisticated threat the possibility of high levels of destruction 
will make political decision-making more complex. This will pose particular 
problems for medium-sized powers such as Australia which cannot afford the multi-
layered naval defences available to the larger powers. 
Thus developments in technology, which were previously perceived to 
favour the Coalition in the Gulf War, can also be seen to have had a levelling effect 
between developed and third-world countries. At times giving the smaller navy the 
chance to bully the larger in situations short of war and allowing it to exert more 
authority in its coastal waters. 
Sea Control and Power Projection 
The United States will remain the most important maritime power for 
the foreseeable future. With the reduction in forward-deployed forces and less 
access to overseas facilities only a credible power projection capability will deter 
other nations wishing to threaten US interests. The ability of the aircraft carrier in 
particular, to flexibly and forcefully express national interest and concern is unlikely 
to diminish while these vessels remain in service.119 
The current cost of cruise-missile technology will put it out of reach of 
most nations, but for the USA the requirement to base power projection capability 
on manned aircraft is in future likely to reduce. The USN has already fitted TLAMs 
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to a wide variety of vessels as part of the distributed firepower concept. Thus in 
future even small surface combatants may be considered to have a distant land-strike 
capability. This will provide a more widespread deterrence capability and allow the 
US to maintain a credible protection of its interests even with a smaller fleet. It will 
also create even more problems for an adversary attempting to keep opposing forces 
at arms length. 
For nations other than the USA the threat of enhanced sea denial 
capabilities, will make power projection more costly and more difficult. Particularly 
in the face of a determined air force, sea control will be difficult to achieve without 
local air superiority.120 The ability to utilise embarked air power already looks 
attractive to rising naval powers such as China and India seeking to acquire a power 
projection capability. The proliferation of small carriers will therefore probably 
continue, not only for their air defence capabilities but because they can be used for 
a wide range of other purposes such as carrying troops and disaster relief. The 
availability of low cost assets from the former Soviet Union will no doubt assist this 
trend.121 
Naval Diplomacy 
The importance of the naval presence mission for maritime powers will 
not diminish. Unlike ground and air forces, naval forces are not limited to single 
theatre roles. With the ability to sail to different ocean areas as required, naval 
forces have a global role. Navies can provide strong, mobile, forces able to respond 
immediately and sustain themselves at a distance until ground and air forces can 
mobilise and react. Naval vessels will thus remain as a useful tool of diplomacy and 
a unique means of escalation control. 
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The days of 'gunboat diplomacy' are far from over.122 For the 
foreseeable future naval vessels will remain potent instruments of foreign policy, 
providing both a symbolic presence and a visible instrument of power. An 
instrument that can initially be used with moderation and then with increasing 
pressure to access a complete hierarchy of naval activities. Though the cost of 
individual ships has increased their capability compared to an earlier ship of similar 
displacement has increased even further. A modern warship can usefully extend 
national influence over a wider maritime area and more forcefully than in the past. 
In the words of the US Deputy Chief of Operations: 
" ... naval forces ... provide a visible demonstration of US support for 
commitments abroad. They strengthen our ties to allied or friendly nations 
and deter aggression by adversaries".123 
Maritime power will remain a strategic imperative for the larger 
powers if they are to maintain ties to global commerce and overseas interests. The 
USN in particular will continue to attach a high priority to the ability to freely use 
the sea.124 The Pentagon has already stated that sealift programs will receive high 
procurement priority. This will assist the ability of US forces to meet diverse 
geographic threats as part of the Regional Defence Strategy announced by President 
Bush in August 1990. This strategy aims to place more emphasis on prepositioning 
and the rapid reinforcement of forces from the USA.125 
For emerging naval powers the value of the naval presence mission is 
already well established. Countries like China and India have in the past few years 
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conducted several extensive deployments for the purpose of protecting their own 
vital political and security interests. These countries have also demonstrated a 
willingness to offensively employ these naval forces overseas if so required.126 
Naval Cooperation 
Already hard pressed to maintain its current obligations the USN is in 
future more likely to look to its allies to shoulder some of these responsibilities. 
With the continuing contraction in the size of all armed forces and despite advances 
in automation and simulation, Western powers are likely to find it difficult to 
maintain skills in all areas of maritime warfare. Joint operations and exercises can 
help to reduce this decline by allowing nations to gain experience in a wider variety 
of warfare areas without the expense of individual national operations. 
Though admirable in concept such joint operations may be difficult to 
achieve without a clearly defined monolithic threat such as the Soviet Union and may 
bring their own unique problems. Of the Coalition forces during the Gulf War, only 
the UK and France were comparable to the US in sustainment capability. Other 
allies required US assistance in some or all of sealift, provisioning, communications, 
medical treatment and often spare parts. In the future the USN will in all likelihood 
need to plan not only for its own needs but also for those of its partners in 
contingencies. 
Other Peacetime Tasks 
In future the trend will increase for both developed and third-world 
nations to pay more attention to what goes on in their own EEZ, particularly with 
regard to the management and protection of marine resources. With an ever 
increasing world population demand for ocean fisheries will continue to expand, 
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increasing the potential for disputes over fishing rights and resource exploitation.127 
Developing countries in the South Pacific are already facing the problem of not only 
how to exploit their ocean resources but also how to protect their own national 
interests. 
Internationally, more interest is being taken in offshore patrol vessels. 
These vessels will be used for fishery protection, anti-smuggling, anti-pollution, fire 
fighting, counter-piracy, search and rescue and supply tasks as well as simply to 
patrol the EEZ.128 Security planning for maritime forces will also have to include 
relevant humanitarian missions such as the provision of peacekeeping forces and 
disaster relief. 
This does not mean that naval forces will cease to demonstrate their 
capability to operate globally but simply that operations will involve more than just 
primarily military interests. Navies both from a practical and a public relations 
perspective will increasingly have to conform to this trend, focusing operations on 
areas other than simply training for a conflict that may never come.129 
CONCLUSIONS 
Whether this is truly the dawn of an era of cooperative rather than 
coercive diplomacy in a 'New World Order' remains to be seen. Certainly the 
historical record would tend to indicate otherwise. Though waging a general war 
faces increasing economic and political constraints, the removal of superpower 
competition may well mean that regional powers will face fewer restraints in the 
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acquisition and use of military force. The possession of capable naval forces by a 
growing number of nations and the need to exploit ocean resources increases the 
potential for misunderstandings and disputes to arise and escalate. 
The USN and other large naval powers cannot be regarded as having 
an unchallenged ability to influence events. With current and future weapons the sea 
denial ability of even minor maritime powers cannot afford to be ignored. Third-
world forces will continue to embrace sea denial strategies because even the ability 
to inflict relatively small losses can cause problems for Western forces in a weak 
political position. 
In the larger states there will be greater pressure to reduce the 
resources expended on military power as a whole. Maritime forces as particularly 
large consumers will find it difficult to avoid reductions as governments realise that 
fleets designed for high capability power projection and war at sea will not always be 
the ideal implements for lower level contingencies. Force size will instead be shaped 
more by regional contingencies and peacetime presence missions, increasing the 
tendency for naval forces to become numerically and physically smaller. To maintain 
political support navies will in future place more stress on the abilities of maritime 
forces to fulfil humanitarian and non-defence missions. This will result in an 
increasing trend for navies to assume more of a coast guard function. 
Despite these changes maritime power still has a vital role to play in 
security affairs and its deliberate and considered use in times of crisis and conflict is 
unlikely to reduce. Naval vessels will still require to be multi-mission capable and 
flexible enough to counter diverse future threats even in the face of reduced defence 
spending. To cope with the continuing variety of tasks despite widespread budget 
reductions, multinational naval cooperation is likely to increase. 
Technological advances in weapons and equipment will continue but in 
an evolutionary rather than revolutionary manner. The basic purposes or roles of 
sea power have not yet been fundamentally altered and as recently demonstrated, 
the common maritime themes of sea denial, sea control and power projection will 
continue to form the basis for maritime strategic planning. As technology advances it 
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will be the understanding of the application of new technologies to the principles of 
sea power which will become more important. 
Turning to the Gulf War, maritime power by itself did not have a 
decisive impact but was crucial to the speed of the final victory. The war's successful 
prosecution by the land and air forces depended to a large extent on the Coalition 
capability to use the sea and strike from it. The maritime elements of the Coalition 
force were effective because of their rapid response, self-contained infrastructure, 
mobility, flexibility and worldwide reach. The maritime components provided the 
capability to exploit the elements of concentration, surprise and economy of force. 
These elements came together in the Gulf War as a classic demonstration of the use 
of sea power to affect the outcome on land. 
Though the Gulf War itself was unexpected the type of war it 
represented was not; an extended local crisis requiring highly mobile forces on short 
notice. As military forces of all types decline, the flexibility and mobility of maritime 
power will become even more important in protecting national interests. 
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Appendix A 
CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF KEY MARITIME EVENTS 
DURING THE GULF WAR 
August 
02 - Iraq invades Kuwait on the pretext of assisting a 'free provisional government'. 
04 - USS INDEPENDENCE CVBG en route North Arabian Sea. 
06 - UNSCR 661 bans the trade of all goods to and from Iraq. 
07 - USS INDEPENDENCE CVBG arrives in Gulf of Oman. 
- USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER CVBG transits Suez Canal en route Red 
Sea 
- USS SARATOGA CVBG and USS WISCONSIN depart US east coast. 
08 - First elements of US 82nd Airborne Division arrive in Saudi Arabia. 
10 - First USAF aircraft deploy to Saudi Arabia. 
Hospital ships USNS MERCY and USNS COMFORT activated and 
prepare to deploy. 
14 - Advanced elements of 1st Marine Expeditionary Force arrive in Saudi Arabia. 
- USNS COMFORT deploys. 
15 - USS JOHN F KENNEDY CVBG departs US east coast. 
- Ships from Maritime Prepositioned Sqadron 2 (Diego Garcia) begin unloading 
in Saudi Arabia. 
16 - MNF maritime intercept operation began intercepting ships going to or from 
Iraq and Kuwait. 
- 13 US amphibious ships announced to be deploying. 
17 - First MSC Fast Sealift Cargo Ships depart Savannah carrying the 24th 
(Mechanised) Infantry Division. 
18 - First warning shots fired by intercepting ships across the bows of two Iraqi 
tankers leaving the Arabian Gulf. First diversions by Navy ships. 
24 - USS WISCONSIN enters Arabian Gulf. 
25 - UNSCR 665 authorises member states deploying maritime forces to the 
Middle East to use measures as necessary to halt all shipping in order to 
inspect their cargoes and destinations and to enforce UN sanctions. 
27 - First Fast Sealift Cargo Ships arrive in Saudi Arabia. 
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29 - 4 US MCM ships depart Norfolk en route Arabian Gulf. 
31 - First boarding of Iraqi merchant vessel, the AL KARAMAH. 
September 
07 - USNS COMFORT arrives in Gulf of Oman. 
14 - USS JOHN F KENNEDY CVBG transits Suez Canal into Red Sea. 
16 - 1000th merchant ship intercept since multinational operations began. 
October 
01 - USS INDEPENDENCE transits Strait of Hormuz and enters Arabian Gulf. 
First carrier to enter Gulf since 1974. 
02 - USS MIDWAY CVBG deploys from Japan. 
30 - Amphibious forces begin Exercise Sea Soldier II off the coast of Oman. 
November 
01 - USS MIDWAY CVBG relieves USS INDEPENDENCE CVBG. 
13 - USS MISSOURI deploys from Long Beach. 
15 - Joint combined Exercise IMMINENT THUNDER begins. Includes 
amphibious exercises in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. 
27 - 500th merchant ship boarding since multinational operations began. 
29 - UNSCR 678 authorises the use of military force unless Iraq vacates Kuwait by 
15 January 1991. 
December 
01 - USN deployed ship strength: 19 Arabian Gulf, 21 North Arabian Sea/Gulf of 
Oman, 9 Red Sea, 15 Mediterranean. 
08 - USS RANGER CVBG deploys from the US. 
- Amphibious exercise begins off the coast of Oman. 
18 - US Sealift update: 253 ships in support, 200 under MSC operational control, 
188 offloads completed (approximately 10.2 billion pounds of unit equipment 
and petroleum products). 
21 - First foating contact mine found in Arabian Gulf. 
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26 - 7 Australian, USN and RN units involved in the interception and boarding of 
the Iraqi ship IBN KHALDOON. Vessel is found to be carrying prohibited 
cargo and is diverted. 
28 - USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT and USS AMERICA CVBGs deploy from 
Norfolk. 
30 - Iraqi combat aircraft commence series of probing feints into the northern 
Arabian Gulf. 
January 
01 - USS MISSOURI arrives in the Gulf of Oman. 
12 - USS RANGER CVBG arrives on station in North Arabian Sea. 
USS MIDWAY CVBG enters Arabian Gulf. 
14 - USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT CVBG arrives on station in Red Sea. 
15 - USS AMERICA CVBG arrives on station in Red Sea. 
- USS RANGER CVBG transits to station in Arabian Gulf. 
US Navy ship strength in theatre: 34 Arabian Gulf, 35 North Arabian 
Sea/Gulf of Oman, 26 Red Sea, 13 Mediterranean. 
- Total of 17 floating mines found in Arabian Gulf. 
16 - UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait expires. 
- Total naval forces include 100 US ships (80 combatants) and 50 multinational 
ships from 14 countries. Intercepts so far carried out - 6960, boardings 832, 
diversions 36. 
17 - Operation DESERT STORM commences. 
- Over 100 Tomahawk cruise-missiles fired from 9 US ships in Red Sea and 
Arabian Gulf. 
Navy launches 228 combat sorties from six aircraft carriers. 
18 - USS NICHOLAS engages and neutralises Iraqi forces operating on 11 
Kuwaiti oil platforms. 
19 - First combat firing of Standoff Land Attack Missile. 
- USS LOUISVILLE fires first submarine-launched cruise-missile. 
21 - USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT arrives on station in Arabian Gulf. 
24 - USS CURTS, LEFTWICH and NICHOLAS liberate Jazirat Quarah Island. 
- Amphibious exercise Operation Sea Soldier IV begins using elements of IV 
and V Marine Expeditionary Brigades and 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit. 
The largest amphibious force assembled since the 1950 landing at Inchon. 
25 - Iraq dumps several million barrels of oil into the Arabian Gulf from the Sea 
Island crude oil tanker loading terminal. 
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26 - Air campaign shifts from strategic interdiction to battlefield preparation. 
27 - 8 Iraqi vessels presumed destroyed and 10 sunk to date. 
- Iraqi aircraft begin flying to Iran. 
29 - 256 Tomahawk missiles launched to date. 
- Marines from USS OKINAWA recapture Umm al Maradim Island. 
30 - To date US Navy has flown 3500 sorties. 
- Battle of Bubiyan results in destruction of large proportion of Iraqi Navy . 
- To date 60 Iraqi vessels sunk or disabled. 
February 
02 - Total of 35 Iraqi naval craft sunk or damaged. With the destruction of all 
Iraqi patrol craft capable of delivering missiles Iraqi naval forces are now 
considered combat ineffective. 
03 - USS MISSOURI conducts first combat firing since Korean War. 
- Mine explodes near USS NICHOLAS, shrapnel causes light damage. 
06 - USS WISCONSIN conducts first naval gunfire support mission since Korean 
War. 
13 - USS AMERICA enters Arabian Gulf. 
- MCM operations continuing. 
18 - USS TRIPOLI AND USS PRINCETON strike mines while supporting MCM 
opera tions. 
19 - To date 153 mines discovered in Arabian Gulf. 
21 - First air strikes conducted from amphibious ship USS NASSAU. 
24 - Allied ground offensive commences. Four aircraft carriers in the Gulf 
providing continuous close air support. 
25 - Minesweepers clear additional fire support areas for battleships. 
- MISSOURI and WISCONSIN continue NGS missions. 
- HMS GLOUCESTER destroys Silkworm missile aimed at USS MISSOURI. 
28 - Ceasefire commences. 
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